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Abstract
This paper considers the `failing rm defence'. Under this principle, found in most
antitrust jurisdictions, a merger that would otherwise be blocked due to its adverse
eect on competition is permitted when the rm to be acquired is a failing rm, and an
alternative, less detrimental merger is unavailable. Competition authorities have shown
considerable reluctance to accept the failing rm defence, and it has been successfully
used in just a handful of cases. The paper considers the defence in a dynamic setting
with uncertainty. A rm entering a market also considers its ease of exit, foreseeing
that it may later wish to leave should market conditions deteriorate. By facilitating exit
in times of nancial distress, the failing rm defence may encourage entry suciently
that welfare is increased overall. This view of the defence has several implications
relevant to a number of merger cases. The conditions under which greater leniency is
welfare-improving are examined.
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Should a rm that is in nancial distress be allowed to merge with a rival; should the `failing
rm defence' (FFD) be accepted as a general merger rule? If so, at what point should merger
be allowed; that is, how lenient should merger policy be? Policy-makers have, so far, viewed
the FFD with some suspicion: the conditions governing the application of the FFD are strict
and it has been successfully used in just a handful of cases in which rms face the prospect
of imminent bankruptcy. This paper presents a new view of the FFD, emphasizing its role
in encouraging entry into a market. The analysis provides a framework for determining how
lenient merger policy should be towards failing rms. It challenges current policy conclusions
in a number of ways.
The FFD, in one form or other, is recognized by many countries. In the U.S., the defence
is included specically in the Department of Justice (DoJ) and Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In the European Union (EU), the provision for
the defence is less explicit; the Commission's case law has developed, however, the concept
of a `rescue merger'.1 Policy discussions of the FFD mergers2 have reached three broad
conclusions. First, in the absence of any other benets (such as avoiding exit costs, or social
benets), these mergers should not be allowed if they increase market power.3 Secondly,
the failing rm should be genuinely failing, and not merely `ailing'. This means that
merger should be allowed only when the alternative is immediate bankruptcy; and the failing
rm should not receive a signicant share of the gains from merger|if it does, this should
be interpreted as a signal that the rm is not failing. Thirdly (and related to the rst
conclusion), the greater the weight on consumer welfare (i.e., anti-competitive eects), the
less favourably is a failing rm merger viewed by regulators.4
1Dierent countries impose dierent conditions on the defence. For example, the 1992 Merger Guidelines
in the U.S. also require that the failing rm \has made unsuccessful good-faith eorts to elicit reasonable
alternative oers of acquisition of the failing rm that would both keep its tangible and intangible assets in
the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger". This is
not a requirement in the E.U..
2See, for example, the OECD Competition Policy Roundtable in 1996, as well as the cases described
below.
3In the words of the U.S. DoJ, \since a merger to monopoly is the classic kind of merger that would
normally be prohibited, why are such monopolies suddenly acceptable if one of the parties is failing?".
4For example, the Australian position is \where anti-competitive eects are expected, a merger may
nonetheless be permitted on wider ... grounds".
1The failing rm defence has been applied in a number of mergers where one (or more)
party is experiencing nancial diculties. In the U.S., three cases in particular have been
important in the establishment and development of the defence. The FFD was rst used
in 1930 in the case of International Shoe's acquisition of a nancially troubled competitor.
The principle was developed further in the case of Citizen Publishing Co., when the Supreme
Court rejected a merger with a distressed newspaper company and set out stringent condi-
tions under which the defence would be accepted. Finally, in the General Dynamics case
in 1974, the Supreme Court concluded that the acquisition of a coal mining company was
acceptable even though it produced a company with a large market share in a concentrated
industry. The company being acquired was not in immediate danger of bankruptcy, but was
declining in protability. This raised the possibility of a `ailing rm defence': justifying a
merger on the grounds that one of the rms, while not in imminent danger, is at least in a
position of nancial weakness.
In European merger control, the case of Kali und Salz and Mitteldeutsche Kali (MdK)
in 1993 established the principle of the failing rm defence (Case No. IV/M.308, 1994).
Following a 30% fall in demand in the potash (fertiliser) market over the preceding ve
years, Mitteldeutsche Kali was facing bankruptcy (it was surviving only due to support from
the Treuhand, which could not be continued due to EC Treaty provisions on state aids).
Despite the combined market share of 98%, the European Commission found that MdK's
market share would most likely go to Kali und Salz and permitted the merger on failing rm
grounds. A recent merger in the chemicals sector reinforced the principle. In 2001, BASF
was permitted to acquire Eurodiol and Pantochim, which were both in receivership, although
this would result in market shares in excess of 45% in a number of solvents markets. No
other buyer could be found and the Commission found that absent the merger the resulting
reduction in capacity was likely to result in supply shortages and higher prices.
The break-up of the failed accountancy practice of Arthur Andersen (AA) in 2002, in
which the various national divisions were acquired by other \Big Four" accountancy rms,
may also be viewed on failing rm grounds. There could be little doubt that AA was no
longer viable as a global player; the issue was rather whether an orderly acquisition was
preferable to fragmentation of the national practices. The takeover of British Caledonian by
British Airways in 1987 was accepted by the (then) Monopolies and Mergers Commission
2(MMC) on failing rm grounds, although some commentators would regard this merger
as an example of the promotion of a \national champion." The case was complicated by
the obstacles to foreign-owned bidders posed by existing airport slot ownership rules. In
1998 the joint venture (JV) between the cross-Channel ferry operators P&O and Stena Line
was exempted from the provision on anti-competitive agreements of Article 85(1) of the EC
Treaty. Although not in imminent danger of failing, the prospect of intense competition from
the Channel Tunnel and the loss of revenues from the ending of duty free sales threatened
the continuation of independent ferry operations. In reaching its decision, the European
Commission discussed but decided to ignore the eects of the JV on local economies.5
However, competition authorities have in several cases shown some reluctance to accept
the failing rm defence, preferring to let the rms ght it out and give consumers the benet
of low prices during the ensuing war of attrition. In the U.K., the proposed merger in 1997
between Scottish Pride, a failing dairy rm in Scotland, and Robert Wiseman Dairies, fell
through and Scottish Pride went into receivership, due to the delay imposed on merger while
a report by the MMC was considered by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
Scottish Pride was in clear nancial distress; but the DTI was concerned about the merged
rm's 80% share of the Scottish milk market.6 Doubt has also been expressed in some cases
as to whether the `failing' rm was in fact failing. In the US, the Detroit News and Detroit
Free Press reached a joint operating agreement (JOA) in 1988, in response to continued
losses by both papers. In the JOA, the papers agreed to set prices jointly, but to retain
independent editorial functions. A key obstacle to the approval of the JOA was the division
of prots. The initial administrative law judge decided that the equal division proposed in the
JOA indicated that neither rm was failing, and hence the FFD provision in the Newspaper
Provision Act of 1970 could not apply. This decision was subsequently overturned by the
Attorney General, but only after a delay of almost four years.7 In the fertiliser sector, the
proposed sale of ICI's loss-making fertiliser division to Kemira Oy in 1990 was blocked by the
MMC due to possible adverse competition eects of the merger, despite the recognition by
5See http://www.ebusiness.com/news/stories/102/10151.html.
6See http://www.competition-commission.gov.uk/wise.htm,
http://www.oft.gov.uk/html/trading/tr-arch/nws16-3.htm and
http://www.ukbusinesspark.co.uk/bpfood97.htm.
7See Kwoka and White (eds). (1999), case 1 for further details.
3the MMC that ICI might exit the market in due course.8 The strength of the parent company
was something of an obstacle in this case, as the loss-making division could be supported by
the parent for some time and exit was therefore not considered to be an immediate prospect.
There has been very little formal economic analysis of the failing rm defence. While the
literature on mergers generally is very large (see Jacquemin and Slade (1989) for a survey),
there are very few papers analysing the FFD specically. The only exception that we have
been able to nd is Persson (2001), who analyses the welfare consequences of the FFD,
concentrating on the ex post eciency of sales of the failing rm's assets. He shows that
the detailed provisions of the FFD do not ensure that the socially preferred buyer obtains
the assets. In our model, merger policy is used as a means to encourage ex ante entry
to an industry. Merger leads to a more concentrated market structure, and consequently
lower consumer surplus and greater deadweight loss. But the possibility of merger in times
of nancial distress increases the expected protability of operating in a market; this, in
turn, increases the willingness of rms to enter the industry, reducing concentration and
deadweight loss from market power in the long run.
We argue, therefore, that rescue mergers are desirable precisely because they increase
rms' market power and so prots in times of nancial distress. In eect, merger policy
aects the sunkness of the entry decision and therefore the timing of entry. Entry occurs
sooner when rms are allowed to merge and thus increase prot when one of the rms
is failing. If the entrant is also likely to be the rst to exit (because the incumbent has
some intrinsic advantage, for example), then allowing the failing rm to gain a larger share
from merger encourages entry. Finally, a lenient merger policy (allowing merger at an early
stage of nancial distress) may harm the incumbent more than it benets the entrant. A
consumerist social planner disregards this, and sets a lenient merger policy to encourage
early entry. A social planner who considers industry prots sets policy more strictly.
Although our main focus is on the interaction between merger policy and entry decision,
note that similar considerations arise with any ex ante decision made by a rm. For example,
the decision to extend an existing product line, initiate a research and development project,
or undertake an advertising campaign, could be analysed in a similar fashion. What matters
8See http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/reports/293.htm.
4for the analysis is that the decision involves a sunk cost, and that the returns are uncertain
and aected by the prospects of future merger. We have chosen entry as an important
example of such a decision; but the analysis can be applied to other issues.
The lack of formal economic analysis of the FFD extends to empirical study. We cannot,
therefore, provide any direct evidence concerning the empirical importance of our argument.
We note, however, that the analysis here bears many resemblances to that of the eect
of bankruptcy procedures on ex ante decisions by rms and shareholders.9 There is grow-
ing literature on this question. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Green (1984) argue that
bankruptcy procedure can induce inecient management decisions concerning investment,
distribution of dividends and nancing. Mooradian (1994) analyses the eect of bankruptcy
protection on ex ante investment policy of managers. Bebchuk (2002) shows how deviations
from absolute priority in bankruptcy proceedings can bias managers in favour of choosing
riskier projects. Even with this recognition of the importance of the relationship between
bankruptcy procedures and ex ante decisions, there has been, to our knowledge, little empir-
ical work in the area. Fan and White (2002) is a notable exception. They examine whether
individuals are more likely to become entrepreneurs if they live in states in the U.S. with
higher bankruptcy exemptions.10 They nd that households are more likely to own and
start businesses if they live in states with higher bankruptcy exemption levels. In summary:
the extensive theoretical analysis, and rather more limited empirical study, of the relation-
ship between bankruptcy and ex ante decisions lends weight to the likely relevance of our
argument that merger policy for failing rms aects entry.
In section 2, we start with a simple two-period model to illustrate the trade-o between
encouraging entry and increasing market power. In the remainder of the paper, we develop a
multi-period (in fact, continuous-time) dynamic model of entry and exit in an industry when
returns are uncertain and entry and exit involves irreversible decisions. (There are, therefore,
`real options' involved; see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an introduction.) There are three
main objectives for the analysis. First, we provide an explicit determination of equilibrium
entry, exit and merger decisions; this is done in sections 3 and 4. Secondly, we determine
9Many papers on bankruptcy procedures concentrate on ex post ecient division of bankruptcy value;
see e.g., Hart (1995).
10Entrepreneurs ling for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 must give up all of their assets in excess
of an exemption level to discharge debts.
5analytically the conditions under which merger policy is eective in encouraging entry; see
section 5. Thirdly, in section 6, we examine numerically the comparative statics of optimal
merger policy, assessing, for example, how the degree of uncertainty about protability of
the industry aects the merger policy that should be adopted. Section 7 considers the
importance of the market structure assumption used in the model; section 8 concludes. The
appendix contains technical details and longer proofs.
2. The Model
2.1. An Example
A simple two-period, two-rm example illustrates some of the issues. One rm, the incum-
bent, operates in a market for both periods. The other rm chooses whether to enter or not
at the beginning of the rst period, before information about the protability of the industry
is revealed; and whether to exit at the beginning of the second period, after this information
is received. The per-period variable prot from operating in the market is uncertain. For
the incumbent as monopolist, it is equal to (1); when both rms are in the market, both
receive a per-period prot of (2). The entrant faces a sunk entry cost E > 0. Per-period
social surplus from the market is SS(1) when one rm operates, and SS(2) when both
operate. Suppose that SS(1) < SS(2) i.e., the deadweight loss through market power out-
weighs the entry cost.  is a random variable, realized in the rst period after the entrant's
entry decision. The rms' common prior over  is uniformly distributed over the interval
[0;1]. There is no discounting.
Consider rst the entrant's decisions when the rms are not allowed to merge after entry.
If it has entered, it earns a expected per-period variable prot of (2)=2. Hence the entrant
enters i (2) > E. To make the illustration as clear as possible, suppose that (2) < E,
so that entry is not privately optimal; it is, however, socially optimal, since we assume that
SS(2)  SS(1). The policy-maker can use merger policy to correct this ineciency. Suppose
that the rms are allowed to merge after information about the market is received, if the
realization of  is suciently low|below M, say.
If the rms merge, suppose that the entrant receives an amount sE from the surplus
6generated by the merger. (For example, it might receive a fraction b 2 [0;1] of the extra
per-period prot.) Hence the entrant's prot in the second period, if merger occurs, is
((2) + sE). Therefore its expected prot from entry is
(2) +

sE
2


2
M   E:
Hence the merger policy makes entry privately optimal when
M 
r
2(E   (2))
sE  M:
Expected social surplus from entry is
SS(2)  

SS(2)   SS(1)
2


2
M:
Therefore, this merger policy increases social welfare i
M 
s
2SS(2)
SS(2)   SS(1)
 M
(given that it is assumed that no entry occurs in the absence of the policy).
The policy can increase social welfare by encouraging the entrant to enter the market
if M  M. If this is the case, then of course the policy-maker prefers the lowest possible
level of M. So in this simple two-period example, the optimal merger policy is given by the
corner solution M = M.
This simple example is useful to illustrate the basic message, but it suers from several
limitations. Most seriously, the optimal merger policy necessarily is determined by a corner
solution. This misses various factors, since the trade-o determining the optimal policy
is not continuous. In the more general setting considered next, the policy-maker faces a
trade-o in determining the leniency of merger policy. A strict policy (low M) increases
the expected prevalence of competition, and hence expected welfare, when entry occurs; a
lenient policy (high M) encourages entry (by making post-entry expected prots greater)
and so also increases competition and welfare.
72.2. The Main Model
Two risk neutral rms each can produce and sell in a market. One rm, the incumbent I,
is in the market at the opening of the model and never exits; the other rm, the entrant E,
decides when to enter and to exit. (This imposed asymmetry between the rms is to clarify
the main issues for analysis; its implications are discussed in section 7.)
The timing of entry and exit of the entrant, and of merger between the two rms (when
merger is permitted) is the main concern of the analysis. Time is continuous and labelled
by t 2 [0;1). The decisions to enter, exit and merge can be delayed indenitely. Once
the entrant has exited, it can never again enter the market. This limits the analysis to one
`cycle' of entry and exit, for simplicity; further cycles could be considered without aecting
the results qualitatively.
We use reduced-form functions for the ow payos that the rms receive when they
operate in the market. If the incumbent I is the only rm in the market, then it receives
t(1) > 0; t > 0 is described further below. If both rms are operating in the market, then
the incumbent receives a ow payo of t(2) > 0. The entrant receives a ow payo of zero
outside of the market, and t(2) after entry while in a duopoly. It pays an entry cost E > 0
upon entry, which is recoverable on exit.11 It is assumed that (1) > 2(2): the standard
eciency eect assumed in many industrial organization models. The rms bargain to divide
the surplus from the merger, with a fraction b 2 [0;1] given to the entrant and the remaining
fraction 1   b to the incumbent. (See section 4 for further details.) Consumer surplus is
tCS(1) when only one rm (either the incumbent or merged rm) operates in the market,
and tCS(2) > tCS(1) when two rms operate in the market.
t is assumed to be exogenous and stochastic, evolving according to a geometric Brownian
motion (GBM) with drift:
dt = tdt + tdWt (1)
11Note that although E is not sunk, there is nevertheless irreversibility in the model, since the entrant is
not allowed to re-enter the market once it has exited. The model could have been written with a sunk cost
of entry (and exit) with similar results. This formulation is easier to work with.
8where  2 [0;r) is the drift parameter, measuring the expected growth rate of ,12  > 0
is the instantaneous standard deviation or volatility parameter, and dWt is the increment
of a standard Wiener process fWtgt0, so that dWt  N(0;dt). The parameters ; and
r are common knowledge and constant over time. The choice of continuous time and this
representation of uncertainty is motivated by the analytical tractability of the value functions
that result.
The strategies of the agents are now dened. First consider the case where merger is
not permitted. If the entrant E has not entered at any time  < t, its action set is AE
t =
fenter, don't enterg. If, on the other hand, rm E has entered at some  < t, then AE
t =
fexit, don't exitg. The incumbent makes no moves. When merger is permitted, then the
action sets are as follows. If the entrant E has not entered at any time  < t, its action set
is AE
t = fenter, don't enterg. If it has entered at some  < t, then AE
t = fexit, don't exit
and merge, don't exit and don't mergeg. If the entrant has entered, then the incumbent's
action set is AI
t = fmerge, don't mergeg. Merger can occur if and only if (i) it is permitted
by the policy-maker; (ii) both rms agree to merge.13
A strategy for rm i 2 fE;Ig is a mapping from the history of the game Ht (the sample
path of the stochastic variable  and the actions of both rms up to time t) to the action
set Ai
t. Firms are assumed to use stationary Markovian strategies: actions depend on only
the current state and the strategy formulation itself does not vary with time. Since  follows
a Markov process, Markovian strategies incorporate all payo-relevant factors in this game.
Furthermore, if one rm uses a Markovian strategy, then its rival has a best response that is
Markovian as well. Hence, a Markovian equilibrium remains an equilibrium when history-
dependent strategies are also permitted, although other non-Markovian equilibria may then
also exist. (For further explanation see Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991).)
Finally, we assume that the policy-maker is able to commit to a merger policy. In this
12The restriction that  < r ensures that there is a positive opportunity cost to holding the `option' to
enter, so that the option is not held indenitely.
13Given the way in which we model the bargaining over the surplus from merger, if there is positive surplus,
then each rm automatically has an incentive to merge. We assume that managers do not decline to merge
when there is a gain to the rms' owners from doing so i.e., we ignore any managerial incentives that might
arise in the merger. There is thus no role for hostile bids.
9model, this means that the policy-maker chooses at the outset a critical value M at or below
which the rms are permitted to merge, if they choose to do so. Once chosen, the critical
value cannot be revised by the policy-maker.
The following parametric assumptions are made:
Assumption 1: (a)
￿
0
R 1
0 exp( rt)t(2)dt

< E.
(b)  +  < (=(   1))
.
Part (a) of the assumption states that the initial value of the project is suciently low that
immediate entry is not worthwhile. (The operator
￿
0 denotes expectations conditional on
information available at time t = 0.) Part (b) ensures that there exists a solution to the
entrant's entry decision problem when mergers are not allowed. ( and  are parameters
dened in equations (3){(4) in section 3.)
3. Case 0: Entry and Exit when Merger is not Permitted
This section develops the no-merger benchmark. In this case, the entrant's (pure Markovian)
strategy takes the form of two critical values or `trigger points' for the exogenous variable :
E0, at which the rm enters; and X, at which it exits.
Detailed derivations of the rms' value functions are contained in the appendix. There
we show that the entrant's value function, VE0, has three components, holding over dierent
ranges of :
VE0 =
8
> > <
> > :
AE0 before entry;
(2)
r  + BE0  after entry; before exit;
0 after exit;
(2)
where there is a cost E > 0 to entry that is recoverable on exit. Prior to entry, the entrant
receives a ow payo of zero and holds an option to enter. The term AE0 is the value of
this option. On entering, the entrant receives a ow payo of (2); it also holds an option
to exit, the value of which appears as BE0  in the value function. Finally, exit takes the
10entrant's ow payo to zero, since there is no option to re-enter.  and  are constants that
are the positive roots of two characteristic equations (see the appendix):
 =
1
2
0
@ 

1  
2
2

+
s
1  
2
2
2
+
8r
2
1
A > 0; (3)
 =
1
2
0
@1  
2
2 +
s
1  
2
2
2
+
8r
2
1
A > 1: (4)
 is less (greater) than  if 2=2 is less (greater) than 1. AE0 and BE0 are constants that
are determined by boundary conditions.
The boundaries between the three regimes are given by the trigger point E0 and X of
the stochastic process such that continued delay (immediate entry) is optimal for  < ()E0
(conditional on not having yet entered); and continued operation (immediate exit) is optimal
for  > ()X (conditional on having entered but not yet exited). The optimal stopping time
TE is then dened as the rst time that the stochastic process  hits the interval [E0;1)
from below; TX is the rst time after TE that the stochastic process  hits the interval [0;X]
from above (having previously hit the interval [E0;1)).
By arbitrage, the critical values E0 and X each must satisfy a value-matching condition;
optimality requires a second condition, known as `smooth-pasting', to be satised. (See
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an explanation.) This condition requires the components of
the entrant's value function to meet smoothly at E0 and X with equal rst derivatives. It
is shown in the appendix that the value matching and smooth pasting conditions imply that
the optimal entry point for the entrant is given by the non-linear equation
( + )BE0
 
E0 = E   (   1)
E0(2)
r   
: (5)
Assumption 1 ensures that there is at least one well-dened solution to this equation. When
there are two solutions, only the larger solution is relevant (as inspection of the value func-
tions reveals).
11The optimal exit point is
X =


 + 1

E
(2)

(r   ): (6)
It is straightforward to show that X < E0, given assumption 1. Notice that X is decreasing
in (2); and ,14 and increasing in r and E. These comparative statics are quite standard;
for example, uncertainty creates an option value and so (generally) delays irreversible invest-
ment, relative to the net present value rule. The greater the degree of uncertainty, the larger
this delay, and so the lower is X. (See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for more explanation, and
Mason and Weeds (2003) for an exception to this general intuition.)
The constants AE0 and BE0 are
AE0 =

 + 1
 + 

E0(2)
r   
 


 + 1

E


 
E0; (7)
BE0 =
1


(2)
r   


+1
X > 0: (8)
In summary: the equilibrium strategy of the entrant is \enter at the rst time that  hits
the interval [E0;1); after entry, exit at the rst time that  hits the interval [0;X]" where
E0 and X are given by equations (5) and (6) respectively.
Equation (6) for the entrant's exit trigger point can be interpreted as an eective exit
cost with an adjustment for uncertainty. Exit reduces the ow payo by (2) and recovers
the cost E; hence the normalized cost of exit is E=(2). With an eective interest rate of
r    (i.e., the actual interest rate r minus the expected proportional growth in the ow
payo ), this gives an instantaneous cost of (r   )E=(2). If a Marshallian rule were
used for the exit decision, the trigger point would be simply this cost. But with uncertainty,
irreversibility and the option to delay exit, the Marshallian trigger point must be adjusted
downward by the factor =( + 1) < 1. (A similar intuition applies to the entry trigger
point E0, although the argument and so equation (5) is complicated considerably by the
subsequent option to exit.)
14The last comparative static follows from the fact that  is decreasing in .
12The incumbent's value function VI0 has three components:
VI0 =
8
> > <
> > :
(1)
r  + AI0 before entry;
(2)
r  + BI0  after entry; before exit;
(1)
r  after exit:
(9)
AI0 and BI0 are constants determined by boundary conditions. AI0 and BI0  are option-
like terms that anticipate the actions of the entrant. Since the incumbent does not choose an
action, the smooth pasting optimality condition does not apply. Value functions are forward-
looking, however, and so value matching applies at E and X. These two conditions yield
AI0 =  

(1)   (2)
r   
 
1  

X
E0
+1!

 ( 1)
E0 < 0; (10)
BI0 =

(1)   (2)
r   


+1
X > 0: (11)
The social planner's value function VS0(t) at time t is a weighted sum of consumer surplus
and rms' prots, with a weight  2 [0;1] attached to the latter: VS0 = VC0 + (VI0 + VE0).
VC0, the value function of consumers, is
VC0 =
8
> > <
> > :
CS(1)
r  + AC0 before entry;
CS(2)
r  + BC0  after entry; before exit;
CS(1)
r  after exit:
(12)
Again, since the social planner does not choose an action, only value matching conditions
apply at E0 and X. The constants AC0 and BC0 are then determined as
AC0 =

CS(2)   CS(1)
r   
 
1  

X
E0
+1!

 ( 1)
E0 > 0; (13)
BC0 =  

CS(2)   CS(1)
r   


+1
X < 0: (14)
134. Entry and Exit when Merger is Permitted
Now suppose that the rms are permitted to merge, but only when the state variable is at
a suciently low level|less than a critical value denoted M. In this section, the merger
point M is treated as a parameter: it is determined by the policy-maker and is outside the
rms' control. In the next section, we shall consider how the policy-maker chooses M. This
section therefore determines the rms' behaviour for all values of M. We start by supposing
that the rms choose to merge (at some level of the state variable); we then consider when
this outcome will occur in equilibrium.
Once merged, the rms operate as a monopoly, earning a ow payo of (1) (i.e.,
monopoly prot). The entrant's entry cost E is recovered by the merged rm (for example,
the cost relates to capacity that is not needed by the post-merger monopoly, and which is
sold.) The alternative to merger is case 0: after entry, that exit occurs at E0. Hence the
value of the surplus to the rms from merger is
SM() =
(1)
r   
+ E  

(2)
r   
+ BE0
 

 

(2)
r   
+ BI0
 

(15)
=

r   
+ E  

()
r   


+1
X 
 ; (16)
where   (1)   2(2) > 0 and ()  (1) + (1   )(2)= > . SM() is a
continuously dierentiable, increasing and concave function. For  < (>)X, SM() is less
(greater) than zero. The rms bargain over this surplus: a fraction b 2 [0;1] is given to the
entrant, the remaining fraction 1   b to the incumbent; b is treated as a parameter. (Note
that the merged rm has no incentive to exit.)
We start by supposing that merger does occur. In section 4.3, we determine the conditions
under which this is correct in equilibrium. The entrant's value function VE (derived, as with
all other value functions, in the appendix) is
VE =
8
> > <
> > :
AE before entry;
(2)
r  + BE  after entry; before merger;
(2)
r  + BE0  + bSM() at merger;
(17)
14with the cost E > 0 to entry. AE and BE are constants determined by boundary conditions.
After entry, there is an option term anticipating merger. The value of this option must go
to zero as  becomes large, since merger is not permitted by the policy maker for  > M;
hence the option value is BE , where  > 0. The entrant's value function after merger is
the sum of its outside option, (2)=(r   ) + BE0  plus its fraction of the surplus from
merger, bSM().15 Similarly, the incumbent's value function, VI, is
VI =
8
> > <
> > :
(1)
r  + AI before entry;
(2)
r  + BI  after entry; before merger;
(2)
r  + BI0  + (1   b)SM() at merger:
(18)
AI and BI are determined by boundary conditions. Finally, the consumer value function,
VC is
VC =
8
> > <
> > :
CS(1)
r  + AC before entry;
CS(2)
r  + BC  after entry; before merger;
CS(1)
r  after merger:
(19)
With these value functions, strategies take the form of `threshold rules'.
Lemma 1: For any pure strategy chosen by the incumbent, the entrant has a best response
of the form \enter immediately if  2 [E;1); merge immediately if  2 [0;M]". For any
pure strategy chosen by the entrant, the incumbent has a best response of the form \merge
immediately if  2 [0;M]".
Proof: See the appendix.
There are two cases to consider. In the rst, entry occurs at some E1 > M; merger
occurs at M, so that the time interval between entry and merger is non-zero. In the second
case, entry occurs at E2  M and merger occurs immediately following entry. These two
cases are considered separately.
15The value after merger can be regarded as the return to the shareholders of the original entrant, who
now own a proportion of the merged entity. The same observation applies below to the incumbent.
154.1. Case 1: Delay between Entry and Merger
In this rst case, entry occurs at E1, chosen optimally by the entrant; both value matching
and smooth pasting apply at the entry boundary. There is a constraint on the merger point
of the rms (it cannot be greater than M); hence only value matching applies at this point.
With this additional condition, the constants in the rms' and consumers' value functions
are
AE =
1


(2)
r   


 ( 1)
E1  


BE1
 (+)
E1  AE1; (20)
BE = BE0 + bSM(M)

M  BE1; (21)
AI =  

(1)   (2)
r   


 ( 1)
E1 + BI1
 (+)
E1  AI1; (22)
BI = BI0 + (1   b)SM(M)

M  BI1; (23)
AC =

CS(2)   CS(1)
r   
 
1  

M
E1
+1!

 ( 1)
E1  AC1; (24)
BC =  

CS(2)   CS(1)
r   


+1
M  BC1: (25)
Just as in the previous case, the value matching and smooth pasting conditions give a
non-linear equation for the entry trigger E1:
( + )BE1
 
E1 = E   (   1)
E1(2)
r   
: (26)
Note that this equation is very similar to equation (5), with BE1 replacing BE0 on the
left-hand side.
Case 1 holds only in certain circumstances, detailed in the next proposition, The proof and
explanation of the proposition are somewhat lengthy and so are relegated to the appendix.
The intuition, however, is straightforward. When M is set suciently high, the rms will
merge as soon as entry occurs. When M is lower, however, there will be (in general) a gap
between the merger and entry trigger points. When the state variable has risen to a high
enough level, it will be optimal for the entrant to enter as a duopolist; only after  has fallen
are the rms able to merge. Proposition 1 identies the critical value of M for case 1 to
16hold.
Proposition 1: A necessary and sucient condition for there to exist a solution to equation
(26) greater than M is M  M. (M is dened in the appendix: see denition A.1.)
Proof: See the appendix.
We now examine the comparative statics of E1 with respect to various parameters|most
importantly, M.
Proposition 2: The entry trigger E1 (from equation (26) when M  M) is
 decreasing in: M;b;(2) and ;
 increasing in: E.
The proposition establishes the intuitive fact that E1 is decreasing in M: a more lenient
merger policy encourages earlier entry. (The proposition is derived directly from equation
(26), using the fact that the term involving M is strictly convex.)
4.2. Case 2: Merger immediately after Entry
In the second case, merger occurs immediately after entry at a level of the state variable
E2  M. The entry point is chosen optimally by the entrant and so is determined, as in case
1, by value matching and smooth pasting conditions. These conditions give the coecients
AE =

 + 1
 + 


 ( 1)
E2  


 + 

E
 )
E2  AE2; (27)
AI =  

(1)   (2)
r   


 ( 1)
E2 + BI0
 (+)
E2 + (1   b)SM(E2)
 
E2  AI2; (28)
AC = 0  AC2: (29)
17The post-entry, pre-merger coecients BE;BI and BC are not stated, since the period over
which they apply is negligible. Note that because entry has no eect on market structure|
there is monopoly both before and after entry|the consumer value function coecient AC2
equals zero.
From the calculations for case 1 in the appendix, the entry trigger E2 is given by f M.
Two observations follow immediately. First, case 2 applies when M  f M. Secondly, since
f M is not a function of M, merger policy does not aect the entry decision in this case.
4.3. Characterization of Equilibrium
This section considers whether the patterns of entry and merger identied above can be
supported in equilibrium. First note that it is always an equilibrium for the incumbent to
play \do not merge" and for the entrant to play \enter immediately if  is in the interval
[E0;1); after entry, do not merge and exit immediately if  is in the interval [0;X]". Since
merger requires unanimity, these strategies are (weak) best responses to each other.
We now show that for M 2 [X;M], the strategies
E \enter immediately if  is in the interval [E1;1); after entry, don't exit and merge
immediately if  is in the interval [0;M], otherwise do not merge";
I \after entry, merge immediately if  is in the interval [0;M], otherwise do not merge"
support the equilibrium outcome of entry at E1 > M, merger at M. Merger is allowed
only when   M. With this in mind, we abbreviate the incumbent's strategy to \merge at
M", and the entrant's strategy to \enter at E1, merge at M".
From the construction of the value functions, only deviations in the continuation game
after entry (that is, only decisions concerning merger) need to be considered. To see this,
notice that
AEi =

 + 1
 + 

Ei(2)
r   
 


 + 1

E


 
Ei
18is decreasing (increasing) in Ei i Ei is greater (less) than


 + 1


   1

E
(2)

(r   );
for i 2 f0;1g. Both E0 and E1 are greater than this critical value. The argument below
establishes that M  X; hence BE1  BE0, which in turn implies that E1  E0: see
equations (5) and (26). Therefore AE1  AE0, and deviations in the continuation games
before entry (conditional on merger occurring at M after entry) are not protable.
Suppose that the incumbent plays \merge at M", and consider the continuation game
after entry at E1. There are two types of deviation for the entrant: (i) those that involve
merger at some lower level of the state variable; (ii) those that do not involve merger, and
so involve exit at X. It is straightforward to show, using the arguments in the proof of
lemma 1, that the rst deviation yields a lower expected payo to the entrant. The second
deviation yields a lower expected payo to the entrant i BE1  BE0 i.e., i SM(M)  0
(from equations (8) and (21)). This inequality is equivalent to M  X.
Suppose that the entrant plays \enter at E1, merge at M". There are two types of
deviation for the incumbent: (i) those that involve merger at some lower level of the state
variable; (ii) those that do not involve merger. Consider the deviation \merger at M < M".
The change in the incumbent's value function after entry but before merger from a marginal
change in the merger point is positive (from equations (18) and (23)). The incumbent will
therefore play either \merge at M" or \do not merge", according to which yields the higher
expected payo. From equations (9) and (18), the incumbent prefers \merge at M" i
BI1  BI0; from equation (23), this inequality is equivalent to M  X.
M is determined by the non-linear equations (A7) and (A9), and so it is not possible
to give analytical conditions under which X  M. It can be demonstrated that there are
parameter values under which this inequality holds. Note that M = c M if b is suciently
large.16 Assumption 1 then ensures that c M > X. The numerical analysis in section 6
provides further demonstration that there are parameter values such that M  X.
16M = c M if d E1 > c M. A sucient condition for the latter inequality is b > max[=(( + 1)( +
));1=(1 + ((1)=(2)   1))]. Note that the lower bound on b is less than 1.
19The preceding discussion can be summarized:
Proposition 3: The `no-merger' strategies
E \enter immediately if  is in the interval [E0;1); after entry, do not merge and exit
immediately if  is in the interval [0;X]";
I \do not merge"
are a Markov Perfect equilibrium for all values of M.
If M 2 [X;M], then there is a second Markov Perfect (`merger') equilibrium in which
the rms' strategies are:
E \enter immediately if  is in the interval [E1;1); after entry, don't exit and merge
immediately if  is in the interval [0;M], otherwise do not merge";
I \after entry, merge immediately if  is in the interval [0;M], otherwise do not merge".
If M > M, then the second Markov Perfect equilibrium is:
E \enter immediately if  is in the interval [E2;1); after entry, don't exit and merge
immediately";
I \after entry, merge immediately.
Hence when M 2 [X;M], there are two equilibria of the game. The derivation of the
merger equilibrium shows, however, that when it exists, it is preferred by both rms to the
no-merger equilibrium. In this case, it is natural to select this equilibrium. Finally, for
completeness, we note that when M  M, there is an equilibrium in which entry occurs at
f M and merger occurs immediately after entry. Since there is no change in market structure
in this case (there is monopoly both before and after entry), it is clear that such a merger
policy is unlikely to be chosen by a social planner. This leads us on to the analysis of optimal
merger policy.
205. Optimal Merger Policy
Consider now the planner's choice of M in order to maximize social surplus. Assume that
the planner commits to the choice of M at the outset i.e., before entry. M is chosen to
maximize the social value function|the consumers' value function plus the sum of the rms'
value functions, weighted by  2 [0;1]. When M 2 [X;M], we assume that the (Pareto
preferred) merger equilibrium is selected; the social value function is then
V
S
M1(M) = VC1 + (VI1 + VE1); (30)
=
(CS(1) + (1))
r   
+ (AC1(M) + (AI1(M) + AE1(M)))
; (31)
where AE1;AI1 and AC1 are as determined by equations (20), (22) and (24). The value
function has been written to emphasize that it is a function of M, through the coecients
AE1;AI1 and AC1.
When M < X, the no-merger equilibrium is selected and the social value function is
V
S
NM =
(CS(1) + (1))
r   
+ (AC0 + (AI0 + AE0))
; (32)
where AE0;AI0 and AC0 are as determined by equations (7), (10) and (13). When M > M,
either no merger occurs, or merger occurs immediately upon entry. In the latter case, the
social value function is
V
S
M2 =
(CS(1) + (1))
r   
+ (AC2 + (AI2 + AE2))
; (33)
where AE2;AI2 and AC2 are as determined by equations (27), (28) and (29). In both of these
cases, the value functions V S
NM and V S
M2 do not depend on M.
For tractability, the analysis in this section concentrates on the case of  = 0 i.e., the
social planner cares only about consumer surplus. Note that in this case, the social planner
will not set M so that case 2 occurs, since AC2 = 0, and AC0  0. Hence the relevant choice
for the planner is whether to disallow merger (or equivalently, set M  X to ensure the
no-merger outcome); or to set M 2 (X;M] and face the merger equilibrium. A necessary
21and sucient condition for social welfare to be higher when merger is allowed is AC1  AC0;
that is,
 
1  

M
E1
+1!

 ( 1)
E1 
 
1  

X
E0
+1!

 ( 1)
E0 : (34)
When M = X, E1 = E0 (see equations (5) and (26) dening the entry triggers). Hence
AC1 = AC0 when M = X. If AC1 is strictly increasing in M at M = X, then there is a
range of values for M over which AC1 > AC0. The next proposition deals with this case.
Proposition 4: There exists a C
M > X such that merger policy increases consumer surplus
for M 2 (X;C
M] if and only if both of the following conditions are satised:

   1
 + 

E0
X
+1
> 1; (35)
( + )b


(2)
+ 1

> 1: (36)
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 4 gives a set of conditions under which it is optimal for the policy-maker to
set the merger trigger M above X. The next proposition interprets the conditions in terms
of the model parameters.
Proposition 5:  There exists a b 2 [0;1] such that the necessary and sucient con-
ditions in proposition 4 are satised when b  b.
 If b > 0, then there exists a   0 such that the necessary and sucient conditions
in proposition 4 are satised when =(2)  .
 If  = 0 and b > 0, then there exists a   +1 such that the necessary and sucient
conditions in proposition 4 are satised when   .
Proof: See the appendix.
22Other things equal, the consumerist social planner prefers a higher merger trigger (M >
X) if increasing M induces a large enough fall in the entry trigger E1. The response of
E1 to an increase in M is determined by the eect of the increase on the share of the
merger surplus, bSM(), received by the entrant. The entrant's marginal surplus, evaluated
at M = X, is:
b
@SM(M)
@M


 
M=X
= b

 + ()
r   

:
SM() is an increasing function, and so this marginal surplus (evaluated at M = X) is
positive. The greater the marginal surplus, the greater the decrease in E1 for a small
increase in M from X.
The rst two conditions in proposition 5 are then easy to understand. When the entrant's
share of the merger surplus, b, is large, then so is the entrant's marginal surplus. Conse-
quently, an increase in M produces a large decrease in E1. In contrast, when b = 0, so that
the entrant receives none of the surplus, its entry point is E0, whatever the value of M.
Similarly, when there is little relative gain from merger|that is, =(2) is small|merger
policy has little eect on the entry decision. For larger merger gains, however, the entry
decision is more responsive.
The least obvious condition relates to uncertainty. Due to the non-linearity of the ex-
pressions, we are able to obtain an analytical result only when  = 0; by continuity, however,
the conclusion holds for a positive  that is not too large. Dierentiation of the entrant's
marginal surplus shows that
@
@
 
@SM(M)
@M




M=X
!
=

(1)   (2)
r   

@
@
< 0:
Hence the entrant's marginal surplus at M = X is greatest when  is small, and de-
clines as  increases. Consequently, E1 decreases most quickly (for a small increase in M
above X) when uncertainty is low. The reason is that higher uncertainty increases the
marginal value of the rms' outside options (relating to exit). The value of the options
are (()=(r   ))
+1
X 
 
M ; hence the marginal value at M = X is  ()=(r   ). This
marginal value is increasing in . Hence, the greater the degree of uncertainty, the more
23Figure 1: E1 as a function of M
valuable is the option to exit, both in level and at the margin. In summary, then, when  is
large, the (relative) value of merger to the entrant is low, E1 decreases slowly with M, and
a lenient merger policy is less likely to be socially optimal.
6. Numerical Analysis
In this section, we illustrate the model and results using a numerical example. With the
parameter values used,17 the exit trigger X = 0:1231, the entry trigger in the no-merger
equilibrium E0 = 1:6812, and the critical value of the merger trigger point M = 0:2178.
Figure 1 shows the dependence of E1 on M as M varies from X to M. It is, as shown
in proposition 2, a decreasing function, ranging from 1.6812 to 0.6669. Figure 2 shows
the dependence of E1 on three other parameters: b; and r.18 The comparative static with
respect to b is as predicted by proposition 2: as the share of the merger surplus to the entrant
increases, the entry trigger decreases. The comparative static with respect to  (which is
not considered in the proposition) is more complicated. At low levels of uncertainty, the
17The values used are:  = 0; = 0:6;r = 0:05;E = 40;(1) = 10;(2) = 3;CS(1) = 2;CS(2) = 8 and
b = 0:5.
18In all cases, M has been set equal to 0.16.
24entry trigger increases with . At higher levels of , however (above 0.43 in this example),
the entry trigger decreases with . There are two eects. The rst is standard in the real
options literature: increased uncertainty induces delay in irreversible investment (i.e., entry)
for any given payo from investment; see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) The second is that the
payo from entry increases because the value of the entrant's outside option increases. This
second eect decreases the entry trigger. In this example, the rst eect dominates when
 is small, the second when  is large. Finally, the gure indicates that E1 is increasing
in r (a comparative static again not considered in the proposition). This is the standard
comparative static for entry or investment triggers in a real options setting|an increase in
the interest rate raises the value of the option to enter, increasing the opportunity cost of
entering now, and so delaying entry. Again, the intuition is complicated, however, by the
presence of the outside option of exit.
Figure 3 shows the social value function coecients AC0 and AC1 when  = 0 for dierent
values of M. With these parameter values, (X=E0)+1 = 0:0405 and (   1)=( + ) =
0:1559; and (+)b


(2) + 1

= 1:6951. Hence the conditions in proposition 4 are satised,
and we expect AC1 to be increasing in M when M = X. The gure conrms that this is
indeed the case. In fact, in this example, there is an interior optimal value of M, equal to
0.1819.
The analytical results are conned to the consumerist case when  = 0. Numerical anal-
ysis can investigate how the optimal merger point changes for larger values of . With these
parameter values, the sum of the rms' value function coecients AE1 + AI1 is decreasing
in M: see gure 4. In this example, therefore, we expect 
M to be decreasing in . This
is conrmed in gure 5, which shows that 
M decreases from 0.1819 when  = 0 to 0.1668
when  = 0:1460. For values of  above 0.1460, the social planner prefers the no-merger
equilibrium.
Finally, we can investigate numerically how the optimal merger point depends on other
parameters in the model. Figure 6 indicates that 
M is increasing in b, decreasing in  and
increasing in r.19
19The lines in the gure are not smooth because a relatively coarse grid of parameter values was used in
the numerical routines, to save on computation time.
25Figure 2: The comparative statics of E1
26Figure 3: The social value function coecients when  = 0
Figure 4: The sum of the rms' value function coecients
27Figure 5: 
M as a function of 
The optimal merger point is determined by the balance between the marginal benet from
hastening entry (decreasing E1) and the marginal cost of increasing concentration at times
of nancial distress (increasing M, holding E1 constant). As b increases, E1 decreases;
see proposition 2 and gure 2. More importantly for the comparative static, the entrant's
marginal surplus from merger increases with b (see the discussion in the previous section).
As a result, E1 is more responsive to changes to b when b is large; this can be seen in gure
2, which shows that E1 is concave in b. Hence the marginal benet from hastening entry is
greater when b is higher; as a result, the optimal merger point is higher.
The second comparative static, with respect to , is more complicated, for two reasons.
First, E1 is a non-monotonic function of the degree of uncertainty  (see gure 2). When
 is suciently large, E1 is a decreasing function of ; it might then be expected that an
increase in  would decrease the optimal merger point. When  is suciently small, E1 is
an increasing function of ; it might then be expected that an increase in  would increase
the optimal merger point. Secondly, a change in  aects both sides of the marginal equality
determining the optimal merger point. Increased uncertainty, holding E1 constant, increases
both the marginal benet and cost associated with merger policy. The outcome is, therefore,
ambiguous a priori. Figure 6 shows how these various factors resolve with these parameter
values; it suggests that the optimal merger point 
M decreases with .
28Figure 6: The comparative statics of the optimal merger point
29Finally, the gure indicates that the optimal merger point is increasing in r. Earlier
numerical analysis of E1 shows that it is increasing in r; see gure 2. When r is high,
therefore, so is E1 and, other things equal, entry occurs relatively late. The planner's
optimal response to this is to increase M: this encourages earlier entry (decreases E1); the
discounted cost of earlier merger is relatively low.
7. Discussion
We have found that more lenient merger policy towards failing rms may be benecial to
consumers and increase social welfare. Despite the fact that consumer surplus is decreased
when merger is permitted, the increase in consumer surplus resulting from earlier entry may
more than oset this loss. In fact, it is the consumerist social planner that adopts the most
lenient merger policy, as this planner takes no account of the overall reduction in industry
prots. This argument, while phrased in terms of entry, applies to any ex ante investment
decision that increases social surplus.
Some intuition can be oered for this somewhat surprising result. The gain in consumer
surplus from earlier entry outweighs the loss from earlier merger for two reasons. First,
merger occurs later than entry; hence its welfare impact is deferred and subject to discount-
ing, while the gain from entry is immediate. Secondly, merger occurs at a time when, due to
the low value of , all values|the prots of both rms and consumer surplus|are low. By
contrast, entry occurs when |and hence the consumer surplus gain from entry|is high.
In eect, strict merger control provides the incumbent with highly desirable commitment
power, similar to Rasmusen (1988). Prior to entry, the incumbent would like to threaten
never to merge with the entrant. In the absence of any means of committing to this strategy,
however, this threat is not credible|following the fact of entry, merger benets the incum-
bent more than continued duopoly. Thus, entry followed by merger (when permitted) is a
subgame perfect equilibrium. By preventing anti-competitive mergers, even in situations of
nancial distress, strict merger control provides the incumbent with the commitment power
it need to prevent, or at least delay, entry. A more lenient merger policy weakens this
commitment, reducing its deterrent eect.
30A related intuition is that a more lenient merger policy reduces the sunkness of entry. It
would therefore be expected to result in higher levels of both entry and exit (merger). Given
that the decisions are related, the policymaker faces a trade-o between the two. This paper
provides a framework for nding the optimum in this situation, which in many instances
would seem to involve a more lenient approach than currently seen in U.S. and E.U. merger
control.
In the model presented here, certain assumptions concerning market structure have been
made for analytical tractability. Of course, other assumptions are also made, but this one
raises interesting issues for future research. In our model, one rm (the incumbent) always
operates in the market; the other rm decides when/whether to enter and exit. This imposed
asymmetry simplies the analysis considerably to concentrate on the main idea: that merger
increases post-entry expected prots, and so hastens entry. (We observe in passing that this
may not be that bad a description of markets in which entry occurs. Geroski (1995) notes
that most entry is de novo i.e., by non-incumbent rms; and that most exit is by young, new
rms.) An alternative market structure would have ex ante symmetric rms with endogenous
determination of the order of entry and exit. In this formulation, one rm enters rst as the
`leader'|thus becoming the `incumbent' in our model|while the other enters strictly later
as the `follower' or `entrant'.20 Due to the incentive to pre-empt its rival, the entry point of
the leader is, in a duopoly, determined by rent equalization|the point at which the value
function of the leader equals the value function of the follower; see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985).
We have demonstrated in this paper that the impact of more lenient merger policy is
to hasten the follower's entry. The eect on the leader, however, is ambiguous, depending
on the relative eect on the value functions of the leader and follower. Two polar cases
can readily be considered. If b = 1, then the leader receives no surplus from the merger
and an increase in the permitted merger point M raises the follower's value function while
leaving that of the leader unchanged. As a result, the incentive to preempt is weaker and the
leader will enter the industry later. If b = 0, on the other hand, the follower's value function
is unaected while the leader's value function increases; the leader enters earlier while the
20For certain parameter values simultaneous entry is also possible: for details see Weeds (2002). The
discussion here focusses on the leader-follower equilibrium where rms enter sequentially.
31follower's behaviour is unaected. By continuity, there exists a critical value b such that
more lenient policy hastens the leader's entry for b < b and delays it for b > b. Thus, an
increase in M has an ambiguous eect on the time to rst entry|depending on the size of
b|but decreases the time to second entry. The overall welfare eect is therefore somewhat
more complicated than in the market structure that has been used here.
In the model presented in this paper, the mode of competition between the rms is taken
as given and does not change with the policy rule or the level of . In other words, the
prot levels (1) and (2) are xed parameters: (1) is the monopoly prot, while (2)
might be taken to be the duopoly prot level in a symmetric Cournot model. However, it
is possible that the rms|particularly the incumbent|may wish to deviate from short-run
prot maximisation to hasten exit or merger. In short, the possibility of predation may alter
the analysis.
Predatory actions which reduce the protability of the entrant will hasten the time at
which the merger threshold is reached (though it should be noted that, as in the standard
analyses, consumer surplus is likely to be higher during the intervening period). It is unclear
how the incentive for predation changes with the level of |i.e., does predation become more
or less attractive as industry protability falls?|or how this is aected by a more lenient
merger policy. Greater leniency makes the object of predation (the removal of the rival)
easier to achieve; but it also makes predatory actions less necessary as a means of inducing
exit. It is unclear what would be the overall implication of greater leniency for predation. A
framework in which rms have some discretion over their pricing as well as entry, exit and
merger decisions would allow this issue to be investigated; see Saloner (1987) for an early
analysis.
We have modelled uncertainty as aecting both rms in the industry; that is, we have
modelled a failing industry. We could equally well have used a model in which uncertainty
aects only the entrant and not the incumbent i.e., have modelled one failing rm. This may
have quantitative eects on the welfare analysis. In the version we have analysed, exit occurs
when the state variable is at a low level; this means that the deadweight loss from allowing
merger is relatively low. In the version where uncertainty aects only the entrant, merger
could occur in a state where the deadweight loss from merger is relatively high. Overall,
however, there would be little qualitative dierence to our conclusions.
32Finally, the analysis in the paper assumes that the competition authority can commit to
the merger control rule. It is important for the analysis that the rule is not altered after
entry has occurred, despite the desirability of this action regarding the particular industry
at the time of failure. This emphasises the importance of establishing the rule as a clear
and general policy and implementing it consistently thereafter. Time-consistency on the
part of the regulator may be ensured through the repeated nature of the interactions across
industrial sectors: a regulator that breaches the policy rule in one instance loses its credibility
in all industries.
8. Conclusions
We have argued that assessment of the failing rm defence in merger cases should take into
account the eect of the policy rule on the incentives for entry (and ex ante investment
decisions in general). A more lenient policy|which could be characterised as permitting the
defence to be used by `ailing' as well as imminently failing rms|may yield social benets
through its benecial impact on entry, resulting in more eective competition in the long
run. This paper provides a framework for determining the optimal degree of leniency, which
balances the losses from increasing concentration after merger with the gains from hastening
entry and competition.
This view challenges several of the conclusions that have been reached by policymakers.
In particular, three assumptions underlying policy and/or practice in this area are questioned.
The rst is that a consumerist social planner (e.g., a competition authority) should be the
most strict in implementing merger control. By contrast, in this model it is the consumerist
authority that adopts the most lenient merger rule.
Secondly, the share of the merger surplus granted to the failing rm is important, but
in a way that diers from the view adopted by competition authorities in certain cases. In
the Detroit newspaper JOA, the (equal) share given to the `failing rm' cast doubt on the
relevance of the failing rm defence to this case. By contrast, this paper argues that the
benecial eect of a more permissive merger policy on entry is reduced if the share given to
the failing rm is small. If the failing rm defence is less likely to be accepted in cases where
the share given to the failing rm is reasonably signicant, the wider benets of the policy
33will not be realised.
Thirdly, a failing rm that has greater bargaining power, perhaps because it is a division
of a large corporate group, gains a greater share of the surplus from merger and its entry
decision will be more sensitive to the merger rule. Thus, the outcome of the ICI-Kemira Oy
case, in which a failing division was judged more harshly than may have been the case for
a stand-alone rm in a similar nancial position, also threatens to undermine the benet of
the policy. The failing rm defence can generate greater welfare gains in cases where the
target gains a substantial share of the surplus than in those where the failing rm has little
bargaining power.
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A.1. Derivation of Value Functions
This section will derive the entrant's value function for the case when merger is not permitted. The
derivations of all other value functions are very similar and so are omitted.
The entrant's value function VE(t) at time t before it has entered, given a level t of the state
variable, is
VE(t) = sup
TE;TX
￿
t
h
  E exp( r(TE   t)) +
Z TX
TE
exp( r(   t))(2)d
+ E exp( r(TX   t))
i
(A1)
where TE and TX are the random times of entry and exit, the operator
￿
t denotes expectations con-
ditional on information available at time t, and the sup is taken over all entry and exit (`stopping')
times TE and TX with the process ftg.
In this `continuation' region, in any short time interval dt starting at time t the entrant receives
a ow payo of 0 and experiences a capital gain or loss dVE. The Bellman equation for the value
of the entry opportunity is therefore
VE = exp( rdt)
￿
t [VE + dVE]: (A2)
It^ o's lemma and the GBM equation (1) gives the ordinary dierential equation (ODE)
1
2
22VE
00() + VE
0()   rVE() = 0: (A3)
From equation (1), it can be seen that if  ever goes to zero, then it stays there forever. Therefore the
option to enter has no value when  = 0, and must satisfy the boundary condition VE = 0. Solution
of the dierential equation subject to this boundary condition gives VE = AE, where AE is a
positive constant and  > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation Q(z) = 1
22z(z 1)+z r.
Now consider the value of the entrant in the region in which the value of  is such that it is
35optimal to enter at once. The entrant's value function is then
VE(t) = sup
TX
￿
t
Z TX
t
exp( r(   t))((2))d + E exp( r(TX   t))

: (A4)
In any short time interval dt starting at time t, the entrant receives a ow payo of (2), plus a
capital gain or loss dVE relating to the possibility of exit. The Bellman equation for the entrant's
value after entry but before exit is therefore
VE = (2) + exp( rdt)
￿
t [VE + dVE]: (A5)
It^ o's lemma and the GBM equation (1) gives the ODE
1
2
22VE
00() + VE
0()   rVE() + (2) = 0: (A6)
As  becomes arbitrarily large, the component of the value function relating to exit should become
arbitrarily small. Solution of the dierential equation with this boundary condition gives VE =
(2)=(r   ) + BE , where BE is a negative constant and  > 0 is the positive root of the
quadratic equation Q(z) = 1
22z(z + 1)   z   r.
A.2. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that the incumbent plays a strategy \merge if  2 I 
￿ +". Consider the continuation
game after entry, and a strategy by the entrant of \merge if  2 E 
￿ +". Value matching holds
at any M  M at which merger occurs, since value functions are forward-looking; hence BE 
M =
BE0 
M +bSM(M). Both BE  and BE0 +bSM() are continuously dierentiable, decreasing
functions of . At M, the derivative of BE  is greater than the derivative of BE0  +bSM().
Hence BE  is greater (less) than BE0  + bSM() as  is less (greater) than M. Hence the
entrant's best response is \merge immediately if  2 [0;M]". An identical argument establishes
an equivalent result for the incumbent's best response. The form of the entrant's strategy with
respect to entry follows from standard calculations.
36Proof of Proposition 1
Two potential issues arise for the solution to equation (26). First, a solution to this equation may
not exist. Secondly, the relevant solution to equation (26) may be less than M, which would
contradict the requirement of case 1 that E1  M. Proposition 1 establishes an upper bound M
on M such that a solution to equation (26) that is greater than M exists i M  M. To prove
the proposition, we use the following lemma.
Lemma A.1: Assuming that E1  M, a necessary and sucient condition for there to exist at
least one solution to equation (26) is M  c M, where c M is given by the non-linear equation
SM(c M)c M

=
1
b

E
( + 1)( + )

d E1

 
1


(2)
r   

+1
X

; (A7)
where d E1 


 + 1


   1

E
(2)

(r   ): (A8)
Proof: The left-hand side of equation (26) is strictly positive and convex in E1; the right-hand
side is linear in E1. Dene d E1 to be the value of E1 where the slopes of the convex and linear
components are equal: ( +)BE1d E1
 (+1)
= (  1)(2)=(r  ). Hence there are no/one/two
solutions to the equation when the value of the left-hand side is greater than/equal to/less than
the value of the right-hand side, with both sides evaluated at d E1. Substitution of the value of d E1
into the equation gives the parameteric condition in the lemma.
￿
If M  c M, then the entrant enters immediately when  is in the interval [E1;1), where E1 is
determined by equation (26). For M < c M, there are two solutions to the non-linear equation (26).
Inspection of the value functions shows that the smaller solution can be ruled out. If M > c M,
then the entrant enters immediately. The situation is illustrated in gure A.1. The left-hand side
of equation (26) is convex to the origin, with  plotted on the horizontal axis; the right-hand side is
the downward-sloping straight line. The gure shows two possibilities. With the lower convex curve
(corresponding to lower values of M), there are two points of intersection; the larger is the relevant
solution for E1. With the higher convex curve, where M = c M, there is a single intersection|the
point of tangency.
The second issue identied above is that the solution to equation (26) may be less than M,
contrary to the construction of case 1. Consider the value of M at which E1 = M; this value,
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￿
 E1 E1(c M)
Figure A.1: The solution for E1
denoted f M, is the largest solution of the non-linear equation

 + 


(2)
r   

+1
X f M
 
+ ( + )bSM(f M) + (   1)
f M(2)
r   
= E: (A9)
Necessarily f M  c M; and note that f M = X is a solution to equation (A9). If f M > X, then
E1 > M for all M < f M.
These two issues together require that M be suciently small. Let
Definition A.1:
M 
(
c M if d E1  c M
f M if d E1 < c M:
(A10)
With this denition, we can now prove the proposition.
Proof: There are two cases. (i) d E1  c M. In this case, E1 exists i M  c M = M, from
lemma A.1. This in turn is sucient, given d E1  c M, for E1  M. (ii) d E1 < c M. In this case,
38M  M < c M is sucient for E1 to exist. E1  M i M  f M = M.
￿
Proof of Proposition 4
AC1 is continuously dierentiable in M; dierentiation gives
@AC1
@M
=  
 
E1
  
(   1)   ( + )

M
E1
+1!
@E1
@M
+ ( + 1)

M
E1
!
: (A11)
Since @E1=@M < 0, a necessary condition for @AC1=@M > 0 at M = X is (   1)=( + ) >
(X=E0)
+1. A necessary and sucient condition for @AC1=@M > 0 at M = X is
@E1
@M
 


M=X
<
 ( + 1)

X
E0

(   1)   ( + )

X
E0
+1: (A12)
Total dierentiation of equation (26) gives
@E1
@M
=
 ( + )

r 
(2)

@BE1
@M  
E1
(   1)   ( + )

r 
(2)

BE1
 (+1)
E1
: (A13)
At M = X, the denominator in equation (A13) equals the denominator in equation (A12). Hence
a necessary and sucient condition for the inequality in equation (A12) to be satised at M = X
is
( + )

r   
(2)

@BE1
@M

 

M=X
 
E0 > ( + 1)

X
E0

: (A14)
From equation (21), this reduces to the inequality in the proposition. With this inequality,
@AC1=@M > 0 at M = X. By continuity, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove proposition 5, we show for each parameter that the functions on the left-hand side of
equations (35) and (36) are monotonic in the parameter.
b: It is clear that equation (35) does not involve b, and that the left-hand side of equation (36)
39is increasing in b. If b = 0, then (clearly) equation (36) cannot be satised. If b = 1, then,
since ( + )(=(2) + 1)  1, equation (36) is satised.
=(2): Manipulation of equation (5) gives the equation
1


 + 
   1

E0
X
 
+

E0
X

=

 + 1



   1

:
Hence the ratio E0=X does not depend on =(2), and so neither does equation (35). The
left-hand side of equation (36) is increasing in =(2). With the restriction that b > 0, the
result follows.
: When  = 0,  =  + 1. Manipulation of equation (5) gives
(2 + 1)

X
E0
+1
= ( + 1)2

X
E0

  2: (A15)
The necessary condition in equation (35) requires that the ratio X=E0 that solves this
equation should be such that both sides of the equation are less than . The right-hand side
of equation (A15) equals  when X=E0 = =(+1). At this value, the left-hand side equals
(2+1)(=( +1))+1; it is straightforward to show that this is less than  for all values of
 2
￿ +. Hence the solution to equation (A15) is such that equation (35) is satised. (This
argument is illustrated in gure A.2.) The left-hand side of equation (36) is decreasing in 
(since it is increasing in  and , and both are decreasing in ). With the restriction that
b > 0, the result follows.
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X
E0


+1 
(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2
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 + 1)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Figure A.2: Satisfying equation (35) when  = 0
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